As much as we would like to see a global war on poverty, AIDS, discrimination and ignorance, I am not trying to compare development work with warfare. But for the one major war effort, it has become abundantly clear that the planning assumptions and hence the underlying analysis were faulty:
There was no joyful reception
The only people who were awed were the coalition journalists
There is no evidence that more lives were saved than lost as a result of this intervention.
Now we hear through the media that there was a lack of
intelligence when the war was launched. What else was wrong with the situation
analysis? What can we development workers learn from this?
Firstly, we need to help generating the missing data and intelligently analyse
the available information.
Secondly, an analysis on international affairs or “foreign” situations cannot be
guided by some home-grown idea. It must be guided by a human-rights-inspired
conceptual framework that is based on agreed international experience, local and
global evidence and lessons learned. And it must be validated by those whom we
are mandated to help.
We’ll better get the scientific evidence and the global lessons sorted out
quickly before our next Country Programme only manages to impress ourselves.
(20 February 2004)